Tracing the interrelationship among play, poetic imitation, and power to the Hellenic world, Mihai I. Spariosu provides a revisionist model of cultural change in Greek antiquity. Challenging the traditional and static distinction made between archaic and later Greek culture, Spariosu's perspective is grounded in a dialectical understanding of values whose dominance depends on cultural emphasis and which shifts through time. Building upon the scholarship of an earlier volume, Dionysus Reborn, Spariosu her continues to draw on Dionysus--the (...) "God of many names," of both poetic play and sacred power--as a mythical embodiment of the two sides of the classical Greek mentality. Combining philosophical reflection with close textual analysis, the author examines the divided nature of the Hellenic mentality in such primary canonic texts as the Iliad, the Odyssey, the Theogony, Works and Days, the most well-known of the Presocratic fragments, Euripides' Bacchae, Aristophanes' The Frogs, Plato's Republic and Laws, and Aristotle's Poetics and Politics. Spariosu's model illuminates the many of the most enduring questions in contemporary humanistic study and addresses modern questions about the nature of the interrelation of poetry, ethics, and politics. (shrink)

Introduction: Play, Power, and the Western Mentality Whereas play has always had an important, if sometimes unthemat- ized, role in Western literary ...

The old humanistic model, aiming at universalism, ecumenism, and the globalization of various Western systems of values and beliefs, is no longer adequate - even if it pleads for an ever-wider inclusion of other cultural perspectives and for intercultural dialogue. In contrast, it would be wise to retain a number of its assumptions and practices - which it incidentally shares with humanistic models outside the Western world. We must now reconsider and remap it in terms of a larger, global reference (...) frame. This anthology does just that, thus contributing to a new field of study and practice that could be called intercultural humanism. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to provide a critical discussion of some key issues concerning the possible-world analysis of fiction. After a review of the most important philosophical questions concerning truth, reference, names and identity, and their bearing on fiction, I outline the possible-world framework, as used by David Lewis (1978) in his analysis, and examine its most important problems. A special interest is granted to the limits of the Lewisian pretense interpretation of fiction that are highlighted by (...) works of cinema. I conclude with an appraisal of the puzzles generated by the attempts to draw borders between and within the worlds of fiction, and emphasize the need for a better mutual understanding of the two perspectives that are essential for a possible-world interpretation of fiction: literary theory and philosophy. (shrink)

In [2] John Burgess describes predicative versions of Frege's logic and poses the problem of finding their exact arithmetical strength. I prove here that PV, the simplest such theory, is equivalent to Robinson's arithmetical theory Q.

For an arbitrary finite algebra $\g A = (A, f, 0, 1)$ one defines a double sequence $a(i,j)$ by $a(i,0)\!=\!a(0,j)\! =\! 1$ and $a(i,j) \!= \!f( a(i, j-1) , a(i-1,j) )$.The problem if such recurrent double sequences are ultimately zero is undecidable, even if we restrict it to the class of commutative finite algebras.

The main aim of this paper is to provide a critical discussion of the relation between realist epistemologies of modality and the imagination. Two prominent realist accounts of modal knowledge are examined: a Kripkean one and Williamson’s counterfactual account. I argue that the constraint that Kripke believes should be imposed on the imagination in order to obtain, but also defend metaphysically necessary truths is too strong. This either makes it ineffective, or leads to serious doubts about Kripke’s famous examples of (...) necessary a posteriori truths. The conceptual tension between a modal epistemology that follows Kripke’s suggestion and classicized Kripkean tenets in the philosophy of language is evinced in the analysis of Soames’ version of Kripkeanism. Williamson’s account follows the same line of imposing very strong constraints on the way we form or acquire knowledge of metaphysical necessity, which ultimately leads to similar doubts about its effectiveness. While this critique motivates some sceptical conclusions, it leaves the discussion about the force and extent of modal scepticism open. (shrink)

Self-serving hegemonic visions of history are institutionalized by dominant memory entrepreneurs, simultaneously imposing an authoritative version of “what happened” and their right to articulate it. These visions and the hierarchies of honour they consecrate are cultivated trans-generationally, aiming to ensure the community’s political cohesion, as well as the emotional attachments that can ensure its reproduction over time. This paper has three objectives. First, it brings insights from social epistemology to bear on a conceptualization of political memory-making and proposes the concepts (...) of “hermeneutical dissidence” and “hermeneutical seduction” to capture the critical interrogation of such mythologies. It highlights the obstacles facing any attempt at subverting them, particularly given the resilience of cognitive and emotional investments in particular schemas of perception and understanding in relation to the boundaries of the community and its history. Second, I transplant the descriptive concept of “affair” formulated by pragmatic sociologists into debates about political memory, infusing it with a dose of normativity in order to shed critical light on various types of hermeneutical dissidence from dominant, emotionally anchored, exclusionary imaginaries. Third, to render the theoretical proposal concrete, I introduce two “memory affairs,” both triggered by debates over the meaning and gender of political resistance. (shrink)

According to how AI has defined itself from its beginning, thinking in non-living matter, i.e., without life, is possible. The premise of symbolic AI is that operating on representations of reality machines can understand it. When this assumption did not work as expected, the mathematical model of the neuron became the engine of artificial “brains.” Connectionism followed. Currently, in the context of Machine Learning success, attempts are made at integrating the symbolic and connectionist paths. There is hope that Artificial General (...) Intelligence (AGI) performance can be achieved. As encouraging as neuro-symbolic AI seems to be, it remains unclear whether AGI is actually a moving target as long as AI itself remains ambiguously defined. This paper makes the argument that the intelligence of machines, expressed in their performance, reflects how adequate the means used for achieving it are. Therefore, energy use and the amount of data necessary qualify as a good metric for comparing natural and artificial performance. (shrink)

In his article “Issues of Pragmaticism” published in 1905, in The Monist, Charles S. Peirce complains that “Logicians have been at fault in giving Vagueness the go-by, so far as not even to analyze it.” That same year, occupying himself with the consequences of “Critical commonsensism,” he affirmed, “I have worked out the logic of vagueness with something like completeness,” a statement that causes the majority of the commentators on his work, including the editors of the Collected Papers to ask (...) where this logic is to be found. The fever for finding Peirce's manuscripts is fed by the hope of some researchers of discovering the logic of vagueness, a hope that has grown since Carolyn Eisele's publication of his mathematical works. Others - and I count myself among them - believe that in reality this is a matter of something already known. That is, they interpret the affirmation ending the paragraph of reproach addressed to logicians, “The present writer has done his best to work out the Stechiology, Critic, and Methodeutik of the subject,” as a tripartite semiotic of the vague, still limited, according to Peirce's older works, to symbols, that is, to the signs of natural language examined from the perspective of logic. (shrink)

This essay’s starting point is Judith Shklar’ diagnosis of a pathology marring democratic societies: complex injustices passing as “misfortunes” that nobody feels responsible for. I propose that denunciations can reveal the political nature of the suffering that everyone conveniently ignores, thus advancing democratic accountability. While denunciations can target various invisible injustices and take many forms, this essay deals with the case of societies with an unmastered past of violence. In order to avoid taking responsibility for the plight of victims, the (...) past is often redescribed in the language of “catastrophe” or “necessity.” Building on Hannah Arendt’s views on spectatorship and storytelling, this essay analyses theatrical denunciations addressing the wider community. Theatre—professional or amateur—can repoliticise neutralised areas of social interaction and transform passive onlookers into reflective spectators. The Argentinean performance of escraches and Thomas Bernhard’s play Heldenplatz are discussed as examples of successful political denunciations communicated in dramaturgical form. (shrink)

Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism can be criticized for the implicit reliance on the existence of what might be called absolutely undecidable statements. Neil Tennant attacks epistemic optimism, the view that there are no such statements. I expose what seem serious flaws in his attack, and I suggest a way of defending the use of classical logic in arithmetic that circumvents the issue of optimism. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

Silence features prominently in both political and academic debates about resistance and complicity with repressive orders. On the one hand, the dictum ‘silence is complicity’ is frequently taken for granted. On the other hand, heroes are thought to be those who ‘speak up’ or ‘break the silence’, contest the regime and its henchmen, agitate and take up arms. This paper troubles these assumptions about silence as complicity and speech as resistance. It argues that silence provides an interesting and productive angle (...) for criticising the idealised, temporally static, voluntarist, act-centred and virtuous vision view of heroes that usually dominates national-myth making. The many ways in which resisters deployed silence selectively, strategically, sometimes courageously, sometimes cowardly is erased from redemptive, idealising national narratives of heroism. It is by looking at these silences theoretically and historically that I hope to decentre this hegemonic heroic understanding of resistance. The work of Nobel Laureate Herta Müller serves as an illuminating example. (shrink)

This article focuses on the most recent debates in a certain area of the ‘law and emotion’ field, namely the literature on the role of affect in the criminal law. Following the dominance of cognitivism in the philosophy of emotions, authors moved away from seeing emotions as contaminations on reason and examined how affective reactions could be accommodated within penal proceedings. The review is structured into two main components. I look first at contributions about the multi-dimensional presence of emotions within (...) ordinary criminal proceedings. Second, I examine work done on the use of criminal trials under the emotionally stressful circumstances of post-conflict societies. In the conclusion I sketch a theoretical proposal for moving the discussion forward. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the effects of religious denomination and patterns of church-going on the construction of political values for high-school students. I argue that religion plays a role in the formation of political attitudes among teenagers and it influences their political participation. I examine whether this relationship is constructed along denominational lines. From a theoretical perspective, previous research heralded the compatibility between Western Christianity and the democratic form of government. Samuel Huntington, in his famous Clash of Civilization, argued (...) that there is a natural symbiosis between Western Christianity and democratic forms of government, going insofar as to separate the world into religious civilizations. While, this approach essentializes religion as a fixed and immutable entity, Huntington also neglects the importance of dynamic historical, political and social contexts that can, and, in fact, do affect the functioning of religion in different countries, and hence their ability and willingness to accommodate democracy. Much research followed the Clash of Civilizations, either qualifying the central argument, by showing evidence of support for procedural democracy in most of the World, but without its liberal component or even arriving at the opposite conclusion that irrespective of religion, every country is “democratizable”. While I do not attempt to disconfirm fundamental huntingtonian thinking, I do raise the questions of how context can and does influence the intimate relationship between religion and politics. The analysis is conducted on survey data collected by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) at Babes-Bolyai University with subjects of 14-15 years old, and the results show that, while Greek Orthodox students do not seem to differ in their political values form their Catholic and Protestant counterparts, they are more prone to participate politically. Nevertheless, their active participatory behavior is only more pronounced in what voting is concerned, an opposite effect being recorder for any other acts of political participation. (shrink)

"Recent decades have witnessed a sharp rise in the number of state apologies for historical and more recent injustices, ranging from enslavement to displacement and from violations of treaties to war crimes, all providing the backdrop to displays of official regret. Featuring a host of leading authors in the field, this book seeks to contribute to the growing literature on official apologies by effectively combining philosophical reflection and empirical analysis. It achieves two interrelated goals: it enriches the theoretical debates on (...) the nature and functions of apologies while bringing forth new insights from hitherto unexamined normative horizons. It further addresses often overlooked aspects of political apologies, such as their non-verbal dimension as well as religious overtones, while testing theoretical reflections through encounters with real practices of state apologies. Finally, the book explores the obstacles to, and the limitations of, political apologies. The result is an excellent interdisciplinary volume that affords the reader a better understanding of conditions for a legitimate and successful state apology. -/- TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction PART I: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 2. Beyond the Ideal Political Apology; Alice MacLachlan 3. Political Apologies and Categorical Apologies; Nick Smith PART II: RITES AND RITUALS OF REGRET 4. From Mea Culpa to Nostra Culpa: A Reparative Apology from the Catholic Church?; Danielle Celermajer 5. The Power of Ritual Ceremonies in State Apologies: An Empirical Analysis of the Bilateral Polish-Russian Commemoration Ceremony in Katyn in 2010; Michel-André Horelt 6. Confessing the Holocaust: The Evolution of German Guilt; Stefan Engert PART III: CHALLENGING CASES 7. Revisiting the 'Membership Theory of Apologies': Apology Politics in Australia and Canada; Melissa Nobles 8. The Canadian Apology To Indigenous Residential School Survivors: A Case Study of Re-Negotiation of Social Relations; Neil Funk-Unrau 9. What Makes a State Apology Authoritative? Lessons from Post-Authoritarian Brazil; Nina Schneider PART IV: OBSTACLES AND LIMITATIONS 10. The Apology in Democracies: Reflections on the Challenges of Competing Goods, Citizenship, Nationalism and Pluralist Politics; Michael Cunningham 11. An Apology for Public Apologies; Juan Espindola 12. Reasoning Like a State: Integration and the Limits of Official Regret; Cindy Holder". (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the main characteristics of the epistemology of modal rationalism by proceeding from the critical investigation of Peacocke’s theory of modality. I build on arguments by Crispin Wright and Sonia Roca-Royes, which are generalised and supplemented by further analysis, in order to show that principle-based accounts have little prospects of succeeding in their task of providing an integrated account of the metaphysics and the epistemology of modality. I argue that it is unlikely that we will able (...) to develop an exhaustive and accurate principle-based account that discriminates objectively between correct and deviant modal knowledge. Even if such an account can be formulated, a non-circular way of justifying its necessity also seems to be out of our reach. (shrink)

A predicate of personal taste occurring in a sentence in which the perspectival information is not linguistically articulated by an experiencer phrase may have two different readings. In case the speaker of a bare sentence formed with a predicate of personal taste uses the subjective predicate encoding perspectival information in one way and the hearer interprets it in another way, the agents’ acts are not coordinated. In this paper I offer an answer to the question of how a hearer can (...) strategically interact with a speaker on the intended perspectival information so that both agents can optimally solve their coordination problem. In this sense, I offer a game-theoretical account of the strategic communication with expressions referring to agents’ perspectives, communication which involves the interaction between a speaker who intends to convey some perspectival information and who chooses to utter a bare sentence formed with a predicate of personal taste, instead of a sentence in which the perspectival information is linguistically articulated by an experiencer phrase, and a hearer who has to choose between interpreting the uttered sentence in conformity with the speaker’s autocentric use of the predicate of personal taste or in conformity with the speaker’s exocentric use. (shrink)

In this article I argue for a pluralistic vision of interaction and social cognition in general: we should imagine the landscape of types of interactions as a line segment whose ends represent radical positions (purely inferentialist or purely simulationist theories on one end and radical embodied cognition on the other) on which different types of interactions fall. The closer to any extreme a particular type is, then the more likely it is to be better explained by the theory the extreme (...) point represents. In order to delineate the controversy that stems from different conceptualizations of the same phenomenon and to articulate my position, I criticize Gallagher’s radical claims of embodied cognition as constituting social interaction. The main point that I make regarding his theory is that, even though it provides a satisfactory explanation for types that correspond to motor-perceptual processes, it only manages to metaphorically describe cases of interaction that involve articulated language use and, generally, semantically charged actions. Given that a serious researcher should be interested in accurate predictions or descriptions, it follows that Gallagher’s account is not all-encompassing, and, given the many virtues of other theories, we should adopt a pluralistic point-of-view. (shrink)

In this paper, I am going to explore an alternative explanation of causation in Graham Priest’s modal meinongianism. Priest proposes an understanding of causation, which is either too confusing, or against the metaphysical core of modal meinongianism. In his proposals, causation is discussed in the context of defining purely fictional and abstract objects, by using a counterfactual approach. In this case, causation is understood as an existence-entailing relation. I will argue that such an account of causation proves ineffective. Instead, I (...) will give another interpretation for causation, which is based on Peter Menzies and Huw Price’s version of agency theory of causation. My interest in studying such a particular subject is to find an answer which is to be used in a further research. The end result of my work will be the fact that causation as agency can, at best, be useful in understanding intentional acts, but not suitable for explaining what it means for a particular object to causally interact with us. (shrink)

This study presents a series of theoretical aspects and empirical results obtained after some scientific research conducted on values (instrumental, terminal and religious) and on the political involvement of students from the university. The study was conducted using the statistical survey method in the aftermath of the general elections that took place in November 2008, among the student body of “Al. I. Cuza” University of Iasi, Romania. The analysis underlined the fact that pupils placed a great importance on values and, (...) considering the way they were ranked, the students are believed to have transmitted a specific signal on behalf of a social category that is struggling to be noticed in the context of the present Romanian society. The analysis also highlights the fact that the students’ political participation is not significantly correlated on a statistical level to the extent of their adhesion to the values studied in the survey. (shrink)

Over the last two centuries, the relationship between philosophy and science has completely broken down, so the question we are confronted with is: How can we develop a new philosophy, which will influence science decisively? The physicists of the last century rejected their contemporary philosophy. They considered that “philosophy today is dead” (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010). However, we believe that the great scientific problems are always philosophical, and only philosophical problems. Therefore, these problems can be solved only by philosophers and (...) scientists who operate at the greatest level of thinking: that of the “paradigm of thinking”. In fact, these great scientific problems can usually be solved by changing the “paradigm of thinking” for scientists. This book furnished more applications of the “epistemologically different worlds” (that replaced the “world”/”universe” – in their previous books (2008, 2010, 2011, etc.), the authors indicated that the notion of the world/universe is wrong). Following Aristotle’s “Prime Mover” (or the “Unmoved Mover”), we stop the regress ad infinitum by discovering the first EW, the EW0 (the Hypernothing). Even if one EW does not exist for any EDW, the Hypernothing was the first EW and all other EDWs correspond to the EW0. Chapter 2 is about the “Hypernothing”. The other chapters continue our works of applying the EDWs to different concepts/areas of Physics: quantum mechanics, elementary particles, thermodynamics (with its main notion, “entropy”), etc. In the last chapter, knowing that Einstein’s special and general theory of relativity are very correct (but in a book 2016 we showed that “spacetime” cannot ontologically exist), we re-write both theories without “spacetime”. Content, Introduction and Chapter 1, FREE at https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_1?url=search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=gabriel+vacariu&rh=i %3Aaps%2Ck%3Agabriel+vacariu . (shrink)

The paper aims to rectify the reception of Heidegger’s so-called “hermeneutic violence,” by addressing the under-investigated issue of its actual target and rationale. Since the publication of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, some of Heidegger’s contemporary readers, such as Cassirer, as well as more recent commentators, accused Heidegger of doing violence to Kant’s and other philosophers’ texts. I show how the rationale of Heidegger’s self-acknowledged violence becomes tenable in light of his personal notes on his Kant book, and of (...) several hermeneutic tenets from Being and Time. The violence at stake turns out to be a genuine method, involving the appropriation (Zueignen) and the elaboration (Ausarbeiten) of an interpreted text. Its target, I argue, is not the text itself, as it was often assumed, but its reception by a community or tradition. Thus, that violence may well instill interpretive conflict, yet its purpose is to salvage a text from a conventional and ossified reception, namely, from what Heidegger regards as the authoritarianism of idle talk (Gerede) in a philosophical milieu. (shrink)

If complexity is a necessary but not sufficient premise for the existence and expression of the living, anticipation is the distinguishing characteristic of what is alive. Anticipation is at work even at levels of existence where we cannot refer to intelligence. The prospect of artificially generating aesthetic artifacts and ethical constructs of relevance to a world in which the natural and the artificial are coexistent cannot be subsumed as yet another product of scientific and technological advancement. Beyond the artificial, the (...) synthetic conjures the understanding of aesthetics and ethics no longer from the perspective of the How? type of question, but rather the Why? Given the current infatuation with synthetic biology (i.e., making life from non-life), there is a practical consequence to such considerations. Synthetic life, as any other form of life, implies the possibility of evolution. Anticipation, which is the underlying factor of evolution, is thus expected. At the level of human existence, anticipation is expressed, for instance (but not exclusively), in aesthetic forms and ethical values. This translates, in turn, into an argument for the role aesthetics and ethics play in the process. Consequently, to qualify as life, the synthesis of the physical and the living will have to efficiently handle ambiguity. Current computational facilities, regardless of their nature or performance, operate exclusively in the semiotic domain of the well defined non-ambiguous. (shrink)

Introduction The EDWs perspective, a new general framework of thinking for all physicists! “The present situation in physics is as if we know chess, but we don't know one or two rules.” Richard Feynman In other works (2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016; Vacariu and Vacariu 2010, 2016a, 2016b), we have showed that the greatest illusion of human knowledge is the notion of “world”, of “uni-verse”, or as we called it, the “Unicorn-world”, and this notion has survived from (...) the oldest times until today. In these works, we have indicated that the “world”, the “Universe” does not exist, but the “Epistemologically Different Worlds” (EDWs) exist (more specifically, for many EDWs, it is about the entities and the interactions which really exist and only represent these EDWs). We emphasize that the EDWs perspective is a new Copernican revolution in human thinking, the greatest movement in Physics, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Philosophy! During the past 15 years, we have applied the EDW paradigm to the main particular sciences and main theories in physics (quantum mechanics, Einstein’s special and general relativity, and the relationship between them), cognitive science (to the main theories like computationalism, connectionism, and the dynamical system approach), cognitive neuroscience, and biology (just to the relationship between life and organism/cell). Also, we showed that the entire Philosophy since Ancient period until now is totally wrong (just because, all philosophical approaches have been constructed within the “Unicorn-world”). This book closes the circle of great topics concerning the main particular sciences (physics, cognitive (neuro)science, and biology) and philosophy grasped in all our previous books (2008-2016): it is about the relationship between the main theories and concepts of Physics vs. the EDWs perspective! The main theories that we investigate in this and our previous works have been created within the Unicorn-world, therefore, all these approaches have been quite wrong. Some of these theories have been partially re-write in our previous books (Einstein both relativities, thermodynamics, and our EDWs perspective, see Vacariu and Vacariu 2016, 2017, etc.), but even some notions of these theories were wrong. For instance, in our previous book (2016), we indicated that “spacetime” cannot even exist (spacetime cannot have any kind of ontology!). Therefore, in 2017, re-wrote Einstein’s both relativities without “spacetime”. The majority of theories in Physics have been created within the unicorn world and therefore these theories have been quite wrong or at least the authors of these scientific theories have been used wrong concepts. This book is a collections of our previous ideas, but we strongly emphasize that some of these idea are quite developed in this work. Therefore, this book can be labeled as: “a philosopher overwriting Physics within a new paradigm, the ‘Epistemologically Different World’ (EDWs) perspective”! We emphasize that some parts of this book are from our previous works (but even so, these parts are modified, we added new paragraphs or sub-chapters), but some parts are new written. In general, the new details of this book are the results of following Presura’s book about Physics (2014) written in Romanian. His book is a general overview of the main theories in Physics. Presura is a physicist who wrote a book about these theories in a quite easy language for large public (also for philosophers). There are quite many paragraphs from Presura’s book that are quoted in our book. We emphasize that Presura’s paragraphs inserted in our book are our translations. Also, we inserted quite many of his ideas but we mentioned his name each time. We apologize if some notions or ideas are wrong translated. The first Chapter is about the EDWs perspective. In Chapter 2, we introduce more details about the rejection of “spacetime”. In Chapter 3, we insert the ideas from our book Vacariu and Vacariu 2017 about Einstein’s relativity without “spacetime”. However, new paragraphs are introduced in this chapter. In Chapter 4, we are indicating that all alternatives of quantum mechanics have been wrong: parts of this chapter are from our previous works, other parts and paragraphs are new ideas/comments. In Chapter 5, we discuss about the Grand Unified Theory (GUT) and the Theory of Everything (TOE), Big Bang (transformed, according to the EDWs perspective, in many Big Bangs – in this way, we avoid Alan Guth’s empty notion of “inflation” which contradict Einstein’s principle of constant speed of light which cannot be surpassed by anything else). In Chapter 6, we introduce an updated version about the dark matter and the dark energy (in 2016, we published a book about “dark matter/energy, space and time and other pseudo-notions in Cosmology” and in 2020 we published a chapter in a book edited by the physicist Michael Smith - see the bibliography. We mention that, in that book, except our chapter, all the other chapters are written by physicists!). For instance, in section 6.4, we introduce a new alternative to dark energy and dark matter, an alternative that is different even from this updated approach! In Chapter 7, we furnish more details about the non-existence of “hyperspace” and the futility of the “superstring theory”. In Chapter 8 in indicate the clear great distinction between our EDWs and Primas and Atmanspascher’s approach (under Spinoza’s “dual aspects” approach and Bohr’s “complementarity” constructed within the unicorn world). In the last chapter, chapter 9, we analysis Rovelli’s rejection of “spacetime” (based on Einstein’s general relativity) within the unicorn world. We rejected the ontology of “spacetime”, but our argument is totally different than Rovelli’s argument. Moreover, we indicate that Rovelli’s argument is quite wrong, constructed within the unicorn world. As a conclusion, we emphasize that we have overwritten the main theories, ideas and concepts of Physics within the new Copernican framework of thinking, the EDWs perspective. The umbrella under which we have been working indicates that the great problems of Physics are pseudo-problems constructed within the wrong framework, the “Unicorn world” (the Universe/world) which does not really exist. Therefore, we have to replace the unicorn world with the EDWs! At the end of our Introduction, we mention that that have been many physicists, cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers who have published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to our ideas long time after our ideas being published!).[ Discovering the EDWs, Gabriel Vacariu HAS CHANGED EVERYTHING in human knowledge! His EDWs is the greatest CHALLENGE in the history of human thinking. Many people have published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to our ideas long time after we published and posted our first works on Internet. About the UNBELIEVABLE SIMILARITIES here: academia researchgate philpapers All our main ideas (the mind-brain problem, main problems of cognitive science and quantum mechanics, Einstein’s relativity vs. quantum mechanics, etc.) from my Springer’s book (2016) can be found in my PhD thesis (2007), UNSW (Sydney, Australia, posted on university’s website, free, by the university’s team in 2007) unsworks.unsw.... Nobody discovered the EDWs during 2500 years, Gabriel Vacariu discovered them in 2002 (first publication), 2003 and 2005. Amazing, in the last years, many people also “discovered” the existence of EDWs! Statistically, it is quite impossible, so many people (hundreds!) to “discover” the EDWs! (Don’t forget, we have been working within the Internet’s world, therefore, communication is much faster than 20 years ago...) “I don't care that they stole my idea. I care that they don't have any of their own… The present is theirs; the future, for which I really worked, is mine.” (Nikolai Tesla) What these authors have been missing comparing with Gabriel Vacariu? They have been either physicists or cognitive neuroscientists or philosophers while Gabriel Vacariu is a philosopher working Cognitive Neuroscience and Physics! This is the main reason they have been unable to discover the EDWs and to think and write the “Metaphysics of EDWs” (our book 2019)!] It is not something surprising since the EDWs has changed everything in human knowledge! Therefore, we end this chapter with this paragraph: “The distance between the pioneers and the much smaller followers becomes so great that the latter cannot reach the former; the age of servile imitation begins – yet not of nature, but of the style of the great masters, zealous copyists remove the labels from the elixirs of the Magi and put them on their vials.” (Arnold Gehlen, Images of time). (shrink)

ROMANIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY do not constitute themselves in an orderly and continuous system of their own. Nor are they indispensable to the serious student of central human reflections and searches for truth. Their real interest is a historical one and, in the light of the globalized civilization of the twentieth century, one of cultural geography. A national community placed at the margins of Western culture, pertaining to it, but not quite able to synchronize its intellectual or (...) socioeconomic development with that of the West, while definitely unwilling to accommodate itself to non-Western modes of existence and thought-such were the circumstances that invited the discovery of philosophical discourses in which some key Western dilemmas and concepts could be qualified. Romanian philosophizing was and remained largely Western in its orientation, but Byzantine and Russian influences are acknowledged. Even more powerful was the sense that the experience of the Carpathian-Danubian area entitled the intellectual members of this community to speak not only for the values of a continuously progressing West, but also for a humanity that was pre-Western or even pre-Christian, a humanity that had not yet advanced from a "culture of shame" to a "culture of guilt", and a humanity whose ways of behavior and thinking were more "natural," and still widespread over large parts of the globe. Unconsciously first, but often consciously, Romanian philosophers saw themselves as bridges over the wide chasm separating Western and non-Western intellectual behavior and as mediators between both sides. Similar intentions can of course be detected among other practitioners of philosophy in Asia, South America, or Eastern Europe. Arguably, however, Romanian philosophy can be seen as exemplary in its earnest effort to transpose Western values and concepts into a language intelligible and acceptable to non-Western and traditional readers, while at the same time rehabilitating archaic and traditional beliefs and behaviors, or making them palatable to modern and Western audiences. This was a worthy communicative effort, one that remains of great interest to the contemporary intellectual community which is sometimes puzzled or discouraged when trying to discover the best ways and means for a common, worldwide philosophical language at the end of the twentieth century. Even a cursory examination of Romanian philosophers should be helpful in this respect. I will first present a few early examples of this effort of communication, connection, and qualification by Romanian philosophers; thereafter I will enumerate the main features of a modern Romanian school of philosophy as it crystallized from 1930 on. Finally I will examine in some more detail the writings of Mihai Sora, not only because he seems the most significant living Romanian philosopher, but also because he typifies the questionings of Romanian philosophers, modifies in original and lucid ways the themes of its tradition and, indeed, supplies a kind of retrospective coherence to this tradition. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to show that the philosophy of Mihai Şora can both be seen as a phenomenological treatment of being and as a general theory of being in its most rigorous sense. At least, this philosophy could be designated as a phenomenological ontology which opens up itself towards an originally metaphysical perspective based on a specific type of knowledge of the sort of “global disclosure”. I will argue too that within Şora's philosophy one can have a (...) twofold approach: one starts from what we could call the phenomenology of the “common givenness” (“ordinary/ quotidian givenness”) and then proceeds (in a phenomenological manner) to a general theory of being, which is represented in Şora's philosophy by the constitution of the model of the “sphere with the null ray”; the second commences with the treatment of the ontological model as such (the model, which is already formed, represents in the end the symbolic structure of reality), that is, from this “general theory of being” (or of the constitution of being) and then advances step by step towards various (phenomenological) applications of this ontological model to the multifaceted spheres of the domain of being (the sphere of language, of temporality, of ethics, of the social, of politics, etc.). (shrink)

My aim here is to analyze a few possible ways of transcending the dichotomous character of philosophical thinking. I focus on Mihai Şora’s philosophy because it is best suited for this goal. The question that will guide this paper is whether it is possible to go beyond the dichotomous nature of philosophy. My thesis will be that, when considering Mihai Şora’s thought, one can answer in the affirmative. We look for the details of Şora’s philosophy which allow us (...) to set forth how actually takes place the transcendence of the dichotomist view. We focus on the concept called “the organic entanglement” since it is the core of Şora’s approach. (shrink)